MLEC: &#39initial&#39 thoughts

The big investment banks (led by Citigroup) have clubbed together to create a colossal $75bn SIV (Structured Investment Vehicle), which the banks hope will help solve many of their problems. The fund has been set up so that banks can pool and price bank debt, as well as CDOs, CLOs, residential mortgage backed securities (and anything else they can chuck in) that they’ve had problems selling and pricing recently. MLEC is supposed to stand for Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit; cynics might call it the Market Level Evading Conduit.

Banks sponsor or invest in SIVs, because they provide leveraged returns from a diversified and high quality portfolio of assets. SIVs buy (or to be more precise ‘used to buy’) bank capital notes.

Banks like the high returns that SIVs provide, and they definitely like the fact that SIVs remain off balance sheets. The off-balance sheet financing means SIVs require no regulatory capital, whilst providing a nice and predictable income stream for the bank.

As SIVs have grown, more and more have been created, thus creating more capacity. The huge demand for bank paper (amongst other things) from SIVs (and other forms of structured credit like CDOs) has until recently been a huge compressor of corporate bond spreads. And so, in a nicely self-perpetuating (or incestual?) manner, the tight spreads have resulted in banks’ cost of capital falling. And the more SIVs they create, or the more capital the banks give them, the cheaper the banks’ cost of capital becomes.

The credit crunch has meant that SIVs have been struck by their perfect storm. They cannot issue any more debt because nobody’s buying it, so the SIVs cannot buy bank capital securities. Indeed, some of them have to look to sell their assets to pay their debts. And, thus, the value of these assets falls. Then banks’ capital notes cost a lot more to issue, and their capital efficiency is impaired, and their returns fall.

So, what do the banks do? They bend over backwards to avoid a fire-sale of their capital notes by the SIVs, and agree to set up MLEC, an opaque, anti-free-market vehicle that enables SIVs to avoid marking their assets to market, with the ultimate aim of avoiding the re-pricing of risk of their capital notes. We’ll give it a miss, thanks.

The value of investments will fluctuate, which will cause prices to fall as well as rise and you may not get back the original amount you invested. Past performance is not a guide to future performance.

Categorised as: markets and players credit

Discuss Article

  1. Tom says:

    It&#39s game over for the SIVsters. The default rate on mortgages continues to rise. It was only a matter of time before the market realised these instruments were worthless. Off balance-sheet vehicles and mark-to-model accounting are both fraudulent and should be stopped.

    Posted on: 29/10/07 | 12:00 am
  2. Ben Lord says:

    Thanks for your feedback Tom. I think the key in any discussion about fraud is the agent&#39s intention to deceive. If you feel that the banks participated in the SIV space because they wanted to engage in a risky business in an opaque and hidden manner, then I suppose the contention is valid. However, if one concedes that the banks conformed (for the most part, at least) with accounting conventions around these activities, then one can also point the finger at the regulators and accountants that enabled banks to behave entirely legitimately whilst concealing huge quantities of risk exposures. The analytical community, including the rating agencies, have long conducted their analysis of banks&#39 balance sheets after adjusting them to include off-balance-sheet commitments and contingencies. I would take slight issue with your contention that securities that have to be marked to model are worthless. They are indubitably worth less than we all thought a few months ago, but in the event that these vehicles enter liquidation, the senior and highly rated notes will still see some recovery in certain, more vanilla, forms of these investments (such as mortgages, auto loans, CBOs, CLOs, etc). Are there any truly worthless structured securities? I don&#39t think I&#39d like to be very long in CDOs of mezzanine tranches of other CDOs (so called CDO-squareds), nor would I like to be exposed to the junior tranches of many structured deals at all.

    Posted on: 08/11/07 | 12:00 am

Leave a comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *